Investigating A Climate Disaster :
When Climate Chaos combines with
Insane ‘Developmentalism’ and State Apathy
A Report by Beyond Copenhagen collective :
A preliminary assessment of the climatic disaster affected
communities in Bhatwari block of Uttarkashi District.
(3-day preliminary assessment tour undertaken on 31 August to 2 September, 2013)
Exploratory assessment done & report prepared by
Dr. Malathi A. & Mr Soumya Dutta
Introduction - The recent extreme climate events in Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh in June 2013 were shockingly painful for us – not only for their extents of damages and losses of human & other lives, but also for the extreme lack of preparedness and organized response – pre and post disaster - from the State and many other actors. As per reports, several thousand people have been killed, along with tens of thousands of livelihood animals. The losses of near & dear ones, homes, farms, the trauma of seeing revered rivers turn destroyers, of massive destruction strewn all around – all are weighing down the surviving communities in the most badly affected areas. Along with the physical catastrophe, the psychological devastation is pressing down hard on these communities.
In this backdrop, and as a follow up of BCPH (Beyond Copenhagen collective) work with the State Action Plans on Climate Change (SAPCC) and the larger Climate Crisis issues – over the last five years, we at Beyond Copenhagen felt that conducting a comprehensive assessment of the causal factors and the damage & loss will be an imperative. As the world is debating Climate Change and its impacts, and more recently – the Damage & Loss from such impacts, in developing countries – this micro-scale effort might also contribute to that. We also felt that this can lead to the initiation of a community-centric response to future climatic disasters (aggravated by developmental interventions – as in this case) and getting communities organized & empowered – will be a challenging, but worthwhile & very meaningful undertaking.
The climate factor – In the middle of June 2013, the (south-Asian) south-west monsoon behaved in a ‘never-before-seen’ manner and swept from east of Uttarakhand to west of Himachal Pradesh in little more than a day, from 14th to 16th June 2013, while the ‘normal monsoon onset date’ for western Himachal Pradesh is around end-June. In fact, normal monsoon onset date of 15th July for western Rajasthan at the extreme west of India was breached – all of a sudden, at a ‘lightning speed’ – and it was monsoon there too, on 16th of June !
(IMD map of normal monsoon onset - below).
Coupled with a reported western disturbance, this caused extremely heavy / very heavy rainfalls (in IMD terminology, ‘extremely heavy rainfall’ at any place is defined as >244.5 mm in a day, while ‘very heavy’ is between 124.5 and 244.5 mm/day) in four districts of Uttarakhand & Kinnaur district of Himachal Pradesh. For Uttarakhand, this was a monsoon come 2-weeks in advance, and in rapid progression. In mid-to-high altitude ranges of Uttarakhand, snow was still melting, and the excessive rainfall on melting snow – coupled with the lake-wall bursting, brought the death-bringing slush-flows on to Kedarnath. While the whole of Uttarakhand received a whopping 254% excess rainfall between June 01—24 over the long period average, Himachal Pradesh as a whole received an excess of 184% (IMD June 01-24 rainfall data below) !
The ‘abnormality’, or ‘climate change’ footprint of this event also comes out from the fact that the ‘normal’ annual precipitation (rain & snow) in this region of Uttarkashi district is about 1400 mm (source - SAPCC of Uttarakhand), and the monsoon months account for about 75%, or about 1050 mm. Thus, about 30% of the entire normal 3-month long monsoon precipitation came down as torrential rains, in little more than a day. We have to remember that rain-fall before the monsoon is small, thus making the June 14-24 period very very wet. Heavy, rain-saturated mountain slopes gave way in slides in a myriad places, wherever these slopes were steep and made weak through removing vegetation or blasting.
The extremely heavy rainfall events of June 15-16 in the upper reaches of Uttarakhand & in Kinnaur of Himachal Pradesh and neighbouring south-west Tibet (NASA image below), fed massive volumes of water to all these Himalayan
rivers and flooded large areas of both Ganga & Yamuna basins and their many tributaries. As we all know, and have been ‘told’ over and over again, Climate Change acts most seriously through the medium of water, in all its forms – excess of, lack of, irregular distribution in time & space etc. This was the case here too, the mind-bogglingly rapid spread of hugely moisture laden monsoon clouds, the super-heavy liquid rains, the combination with melting solid-liquid snow, and the rapid & massive rise of liquid river flows – all manifestations of a chaotic climate change through this most potent medium.
NASA satellite images show – above : extremely heavy rain fall (dark blue areas >300 mm/day) happened in Pithoragarh, Chamoli, Rudraprayag & Uttarkashi, and in Kinnaur of HP. Heavy to very heavy rainfall also occurred in many neighbouring areas of south Tibet. NASA satellite images - below left shows heavy snow & rain-clouds over Uttarakhand areas on 17th of June, while below right is an image of the flooding in Ganga, Yamuna, Ghagra & their many tributaries (usually seen in satellite images of this resolution - as very thin threads, but in this image – wide swathes of 5-12 KMs on 20th).
The Himalayas are much more vulnerable compared to plains India and are reportedly getting warmer at a much faster rate of nearly 0.6 °C every decade, about three times the global average warming rate. Average annual rainfall is increasing at a rate of about 65 millimetres each decade and the monsoon season is getting wetter, while winters are getting increasingly drier (according to Shrestha, U. B., Gautam, S. & Bawa, K. PLoS ONE 7, e36741 (2012).
If we look at meteorological data from IMD (the records for Dehradoon, the capital city of Uttarakhand – as an important city, is available for the last 100 years), and compare the June rainfall data for the first decade of the 20th century with its last decade – the difference is striking. In place of a monthly average of 123 mm in averaged June from 1901-1910, the last decade years 1991-2000 shows June average rains as 373 mm ! This might not be exclusively driven by global warming, but the massive change is sure indication of larger-than-local drivers. Even from this higher figures, the single day precipitation of about 300 mm points to a climate change on steroids.
| Year | Mean Temperature in 0C | Total Rainfall in the month in mm | |
| Maximum | Minimum | ||
| 1901 | 37.3 | 23.8 | 44.9 |
| 1902 | 33.7 | 23.5 | 93.9 |
| 1903 | 37.1 | 24.5 | 24.8 |
| 1904 | 34.3 | 24.1 | 94.7 |
| 1905 | 35.6 | 23.8 | 133.0 |
| 1906 | 34.6 | 23.4 | 248.9 |
| 1907 | 36.2 | 23.0 | 29.9 |
| 1908 | 36.8 | 23.9 | 167.6 |
| 1909 | 31.5 | 22.4 | 262.1 |
| 1910 | 33.7 | 23.6 | 130.3 |
| 1991 | 33.6 | 23.0 | 265.2 |
| 1992 | 35.6 | 22.9 | 156.1 |
| 1993 | 34.4 | 22.6 | 229.0 |
| 1994 | 35.9 | 24.1 | 217.7 |
| 1995 | 37.3 | 24.9 | 62.9 |
| 1996 | 33.4 | 23.4 | 356.8 |
| 1997 | 33.1 | 21.7 | 397.4 |
| 1998 | 34.3 | 23.8 | 110.4 |
| 1999 | 32.9 | 22.8 | 396.1 |
| 2000 | 30.8 | 22.7 | 308.6 |
Thus, the tragic climatic events of mid-June, over the Indian Himalayas and adjoining areas of Nepal & Tibet – are anything but “normal”, and have “Climate Change Impacts” written all over them, however much we try to play that connection down due to “lack of solid scientific evidence”. Facing these massive challenges, it’s doubtful whether ‘responsible authorities’ are even aware of the magnitude of the problem(s). For example, the huge urbanisation drive that Dehradoon has undergone in the last 10-12 years (a period after the above IMD records), will be magnifying any extreme climate event that might befall this un-prepared city – but who is listening ?
Evaluating the “LOSS & DAMAGE” : a clear case for Climate Finance – As shown in the previous section, the extreme climatic events of June 15-17 in parts of the Indian Himalayas (and some parts of adjoining Nepal), were far from ‘normal’, and has clear signs of “CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTs”. In the global climate change negotiations, the recognition that serious climate change impacts are already happening and are causing massive damages to vulnerable sections of third-world society, has now given rise to the concept of (and work on) climate change induced ‘Loss & damage’. There is a clear reference in the UNFCCC CoP-16 (Conference of Parties-16, to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) held in Cancun, Mexico - to address the issue of Loss & damage arising out of the impacts of climate change in developing countries, with the idea of connecting these to climate finance.
“The Conference of Parties (COP) in its decision 
1/CP.16 established the Cancun Adaptation Framework with the objective of enhancing action on adaptation. It further decided to establish a work programme in order to consider approaches to address loss and damage associated with climate change impacts in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.
The COP, by the same decision, requested the SBI (Subsidiary Body on Implementation) to agree on activities to be undertaken under the work programme and to make recommendations on loss and damage to the COP for its consideration at COP 18.” (from - UNFCCC side event on Current knowledge, expertise and potential support to the work programme on loss and damage under the Cancun Adaptation Framework).
1/CP.16 established the Cancun Adaptation Framework with the objective of enhancing action on adaptation. It further decided to establish a work programme in order to consider approaches to address loss and damage associated with climate change impacts in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.The COP, by the same decision, requested the SBI (Subsidiary Body on Implementation) to agree on activities to be undertaken under the work programme and to make recommendations on loss and damage to the COP for its consideration at COP 18.” (from - UNFCCC side event on Current knowledge, expertise and potential support to the work programme on loss and damage under the Cancun Adaptation Framework).
We also hope that through various such assessment works, the climate justice question for those contributing to the destructive change will be held more firmly accountable to the actual damages caused by their emissions.
Wrong ‘Development’ and human greed also contributed in large measures – This extreme climatic event was made much more devastating by the wrong development policies and greed in large measures. In river valley after river valley in the Himalayas, hydroelectricity projects have blasted geologically unstable mountain slopes, drilled massive tunnels through these fragile mountains and dumped the muck in the river beds. The picture below shows the ‘small’ Assiganga-II hydroelectricity project’s tunnel, seen narrowing the river by dumping drilled muck directly into the river bed, forcing it to re-route towards the other bank. This is not a ‘big’ tunnel, but neither is Assiganga a ‘big’ river like Bhagirathi or Alaknanda. And during the August 2012 floods, Assiganga washed away large parcels of land here on the ‘other bank’.
This has not only narrowed down the rivers (just like Delhi did to Yamuna), but also made mountain slopes more prone to slides with rains. And the torrents of water combined with dumped muck & silt, made for a potent hammering to both its banks, and anything in between. On top of that, structures like power houses, hotels, resorts …. had been built right on the river beds, making them extremely vulnerable. (below – destroyed Assiganga-II power house, situated bang in the middle of the river bed). Our blind greed has made us ignore the fact that rivers own and need the entire river bed, not a narrowed, ‘trained’ channel.
This reinforced concrete structure of the Assiganga-II powerhouse was no match for the enraged river, which smashed and forced through the power house during the August 2012 cloud-burst incident, throwing unfortunate people there dead and mutilated and reclaiming what is her right – the entire river bed. Instead of learning from these wrongs, the State (this is a project of ‘Uttarakhand Jal Vidyut Nigam’ and is financed by NABARD – both Govt agencies) is now spending more public money to “train” the river with stone structures (visible in the picture above), thus again narrowing the rivers width of flow – till Assiganga gets angry again. The forest department also built a nursery encroaching on the river bed, just downstream of the power house, and that too has been wiped away, without a trace - by the raging river. Similar hydro-power-dam enhanced disaster stories are there from Alaknanda valley too, where both the Vishnugad & Srinagar hydro projects created havoc, by not opening the gates in time, by blasting the mountainside with dynamites, by dumping huge amounts of drilled muck in the river bed – restricting the rivers flow capacity drastically. In this report, though, we will be restricting to findings from our first hand data & information from the current visit to Uttarkashi district.
Many hotels & houses were also allowed to be constructed on the river bed, and when the super heavy rains came, entire settlements were wiped out (below – earth moving machinery removing debris from river bed, with remains of destroyed houses from the ‘illegal’ river-bed settlement visible near the confluence of Assiganga with Bhagirathi – seen at extreme right, at Gangori, five KMs upstream of Uttarkashi).
Cutting through the vegetation cover and blasting loosely held rock-soil aggregates on these steep mountain slopes – for building big roads, has also contributed to repeated landslides in many places. There is a big difference though – as roads have become a vital part of the mountain community’s lives and economy, unlike the dams & hydro-power projects – which have benefited few locals. Still, there are now compelling reasons to critically examine whether there are other methods of transportation that can better suit mountain conditions – and be less damaging to these fragile mountains – at least in some cases. Unfortunately, in the strong and emotional demand for quick road ‘connectivity’ restoration (no doubt, a very genuine & urgent requirement), this exploration of possible less-damaging alternative is likely to be buried. (below - one of numerous slides from the road zones, on NH-108. Remnants of the road is visible from centre-right of the picture)
In the final count, it was the Chaotic Extreme Climate that was the primary reason for this disaster of horrific measures. Though wrong developmental approach, greed and corrupt practices – all contributed significantly, in our visits to several mountain villages where neither dams nor roads reached, and yet the devastation suffered is huge, this fact is established beyond reasonable doubts.
The decision to do more - We at BCPH were very disturbed by the large scale loss of lives & property of the vulnerable mountain people, and even more by the callous neglect by the State and other ‘responsible’ actors – to take reasonable measures to reduce these impacts. Having engaged with the Uttarakhand State Action Plan on Climate Change – with a variety of actors over the past 2 ½ years, specially the adaptation needs - we decided to take some small grounded action. Uttarkashi district being one of the most severely affected districts (others are Pithoragarh, Rudraprayag & Chamoli) in Uttarakhand, and our being a little more familiar with these areas, led to the selection of Bhatwari Block in Uttarkashi district as one area where we might initiate this work & where major devastation has occurred and the plight of many interior villages are not fully known. Further, Dr Malathi of Delhi University’s Deptt of Social Work – who agreed to collaborate on this, had earlier lead some research in nearby areas, and established some contacts, which can facilitate the present work.
The objective of the exploratory visit was to reach some of the villages in Uttarkashi district badly affected by the recent ‘extreme climatic event’ and to understand the extent of damage and loss to the lives and livelihoods of the people – as well as the local economy - as a precursor to serious and in-depth investigation which will pave way for a comprehensive intervention in the near future. (below – visiting land-slide destroyed farms & roads by the river Bhagirathi, with edge of the broken road visible at the top of the slope).
The preliminary/exploratory assessments were with regard to --
a. the kinds & extents of damages & losses suffered by people/ communities/ local economy of this area of Uttarkashi, Uttarakhand,
b. the kinds & reach of various responses by different agencies - Govt & non-govt, in these areas, and
c. the critical needs of and responses needed to help affected communities;
The assessment was undertaken from 31st August to 2nd September
Places visited and their brief demographic data (places visited are yellow-pointer marked in the Google image below) –
Base : Uttarkashi town (1145 metres above MSL, 30-43-47 N, 78-26-41 E);
In Bhagirathi valley - road-side villages of –-
Netala (~1300 Mtr), HH-270, Tot_P-1311, Tot_M-680, Tot_F-631, Pop_06-145;
Maneri (~1370 Mtr), HH-299, Tot_P-1271, Tot_M-697, Tot_F-574, Pop_06-165;
mountain villages of --
Kaneth (~1630 Mtr), HH-1(?), Tot_P-6 (?);
Aungee (~1680 Mtr), HH-66, Tot_P-302, Tot_M-162, Tot_F-140, Pop_06-46;
Bisanpur (in Sainj) (~1460 Mtr), HH-15,
In Assi ganga valley – roadside villages of Rabara (~1300 Mtr), Dagali,
Seen the ravaged villages of –
Didsari (~1370 Mtr), HH-71, Tot_P-383, Tot_M-194, Tot_F-189, Pop_06-54;
Uttaro (~1260 Mtr), HH-
HH- Total no of House Holds, Tot_P is total population, Tot_M is total no of males, Tot_F is total no of females, and Pop_06 is no of children between 0 & 6 yrs. of age.
Preliminary Assessments
a. Immediate Relief - some relief is reaching villages - though not regularly, both from the Govt, as well as from NGOs, with support from international / national funding agencies like PLAN, CASA, OXFAM, Action Aid, JAPAN Foundation, Reliance foundation etc. Road-proximate villages are better off in this regard. Several NGOs of Uttarakhand, like Bhuvaneswari Mahila Ashram, Himalayan Paryavaran Suraksha Samity, ……… are acting as the outreach arms of these funding agencies & Govt. (below – relief records)
b. Relief continuation - These ‘relief’ are mostly in terms of some food/ rations (critically needed in interior villages), tarpaulin sheets, solar lanterns & other flashlights, medicines, daily necessities like soap, matchboxes and candles. Worryingly - Even 2 ½ months after the disaster, many communities are desperate for regular & basic food supply ! After an initial 15 Kgs each of rice & Atta, the Govt has not been a major provider. Cooking gas cylinders are being reached to some road-side & road-proximate villages – some time on mules hired by the Govt agencies, but interior villages are still deprived. Lack of food items is still a major concern. Like in many other villages, we heard the story of how the small hamlet of Bisanpur – with about 15 households, fed nearly 400 stranded people (mostly tourists) for a couple of days, before they could be evacuated. The villagers exhausted their food stocks, but are now facing partial hunger, with only occasional rations reaching them.
c. Monetary compensation for property losses - Very little in terms of monetary compensation for loss of houses & land (pics below) - have actually reached people, though several announcements have been made by the Govt. Again, road-proximate villages have received a little, others - very little or none.
(top – houses destroyed by Bhagirathi river flood)
(above – Didsari village suffered immense losses – lives, houses, land. Many families were re-settled here from the old Didsari village after the 1991 earthquake, to be devastated once again – by rain & floods this time). Just looking at the Didsari village, which have reportedly lost (washed away or very badly damaged) 53 houses, a very modest Rs.4 lakh per house (even if the land for building these are given free by the government) will require Rs. Two crore twelve-lakhs. And the houses nearby will also be feeling the threat. The farm lands lost are also huge – and @Rs.2 lakh per ‘Nali’, will add more crores.
d. Loss of human lives is another point - with no major assessment effort to include migrant workers / non- registered residents. During this short trip, we did not enquire about compensation for death & other human losses.
e. Lots of other material damages, like economically productive "Gharats" (traditional water mills) having been washed away - have not even been mentioned for compensation. Many other livelihood losses are massive - no compensation yet, not to talk about restoration;
f. Productive / livelihood animal loss assessments have also not been done in any rigorous manner. Cattle, sheep, goats and mules have been lost. While each mule costs Rs.80,000 to 100,000 (being a valuable livelihood resource in mountain transport in remote areas), cost of other animals vary with their age, productivity & breed. No compensation received by most people yet.
g. As there are few options for incomes and food is scarce, the old, infirm, ex-business-persons – all have been forced to eke out livings through whatever is available, like carrying stones for construction – under MGNREGS (picture above) or seeking shelter in Ashrams wherever available. We met many people with similar sentiments – ‘we don’t want to live like beggars, but unless the roads are restored – we have no options’. This was reflected in the angry rally in Uttarkashi town, with the slogan – “Nahi chahiye ye rahat ke saman,
Hame do Sadak, Surakhsa aur Samman”.
(“We don’t want this relief material, Give us Roads, Safety and Dignity”).
The persistent demand for and critical importance of ‘sadak’ (roads) was all pervasive, and everyone seem to be waiting for the day when the roads are opened, tourists come in numbers and employment & livelihood options are created again. The repeated expressions of “aaj to jhel liya, kaal keya khayenge?” (“today we are suffering, but what will we eat tomorrow?”) cropped up at many places.
h. Massive losses to the livelihoods & local economy from tourism - is largely un-addressed. This is a state where the “char dham” religious destinations and the mighty Himalayas used to bring several millions of pilgrims and tourists/ trekkers every year. The state gets about 65% of its income from services sector – and most of it from tourism, along with a bulk of the employments and livelihoods provided by tourism (apart from agri & horticulture, where opportunities have shrunk) – and can ill afford to neglect this aspect. Some people are now blaming the huge rush of tourists and that is partly true, but looking at the thousands of small family-run hotels, guest houses & restaurants lying closed due to no tourist arrival, and the local economy in a shambles – deeper investigations & better ‘solutions’ than the blame games – are called for.
Apart from the loss of current-season’s income, many of the owner-entrepreneurs are hard-pressed to pay mortgage payments to banks on the loans they took for these enterprises. All tourism sector jobs (the major contributor to both employment & income) like hotel operators, cooks, guides, porters, tour operators, drivers,…. very seriously affected. A roughly estimated 54,000 drivers of commercial vehicles – mostly dependent on tourists, were badly affected in the beginning, but are now trying to recoup losses by charging usurious rates. And the burden is falling on mostly locals, as there are hardly any tourists even now (1st week of September, 2013) – over 2 ½ months after the disaster. Even those seemingly less dependent on tourism – milk producers, wool & woollen clothing artisans & sellers/ shops etc. are in a terrible slump due to drastic shrinkage of tourism markets. Many of these outlets are lying closed. (below - small hotel by Bhagirathi river, beyond Netala – all closed for last 2 ½ months)
i. Very little or zero disaster preparedness is visible - in terms of building community organization/ capacity or preparing vulnerable communities for coping with future disasters, which will increase in both frequency & intensity – as per all the scientific studies. On specific enquiry on this aspect, with the NGOs providing relief – all we could find in terms of preparedness are advices about keeping their important papers in a secure place, and providing a torch-light to be kept with them. The state has a Disaster Management & Mitigation Centre, but this was found to be largely non-functional during the actual disaster. The National Disaster Management Authority was found to be equally in deep slumber. Even with this bitter experience, there is hardly any move to empower the communities, and build up disaster warning & response infrastructure. The two Doppler Radars (which could possibly have given better & pin-pointed warnings of excessive rainfalls) sanctioned for the state, were not installed for years, due to political turf wars. Even the limited & broad warnings given by the Dehradoon office of the Indian Meteorological Department, didn’t move from the other govt offices in Dehradoon, proving to be utterly useless for the disaster hit people.
j. Shelter - With winter approaching in 2-months, and many families without roofs over their heads - little is done except giving tarpaulins. Hundreds of crores of Rupees already with govt, & thousands of crores announced for this - not visible on the ground yet. As many existing villages have been declared unsafe (the Geological Survey of India has identified about 400 villages as vulnerable and needed to be shifted), the land for resettling them in a land-scarce state is also a massive challenge. With about 62% of total geographic area of the state under the forest department (actual forest & tree cover is only around 47-48% of the total land area), locating suitable sites is going to be a herculean task. Any serious initiative to re-locate/ re-settle the large number of threatened villages, will have to necessarily look into the forest department land, those without forest & tree cover – but this needs a collective political will & commitment. Apart from this, the State govt is reportedly estimated /looking to spend about Rs.35 crores per village for resettlement. With all the available allocations, and if all available resources are honestly & judiciously spent (a very tough call in the Indian context, more so with a weak governance structure as in Uttarakhand) – only around 50 odd villages can be taken up for resettlement per year, on this terms & budget. That will mean nearly a decade long wait for the last ones chosen, and there is no guarantee that more such disasters are not coming in between.
k. The present farming crisis & the coming ones – As all scientific studies are showing (by Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research/ World Bank, by International Energy Agency,….), these kinds of extreme climatic events will increase in future – both in frequency and magnitude, unless the world changes course drastically, today (and no sign of that is visible yet). For Himalayan/ mountainous states like Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir, Arunachal Pradesh etc., these extreme events are even more dangerous, as the constraints of land, terrain and fragility of the mountain slopes compound the challenges. In that perspective, we must try to understand the nature of the present crisis created by the extreme climatic events of June 2013, and devise response strategies to help farmers cope to their best abilities.
l. Large losses of scarce farm-lands - In the massive rains of June 15-16, mountain slopes got saturated and large scale landslides occurred in thousands of places in the four severely affected districts of Uttarakhand (Uttarkashi, Rudraprayag, Chamoli and Pithoragarh) and Kinnaur district of Himachal Pradesh. Uttarakhand has very little land in private hands, with less than 14% of the State’s roughly 53,500 Sq. KMs being farm land. In this disaster, there has been a massive loss of farm lands (apart from residential plots) – which have either been washed away into the rivers, or slides have brought large amounts of debris on them making them uncultivable. Just as an example of the magnitude of losses, the small hamlet of Bisanpur (part of Sainj Gram Panchayat) – with just 15 households - have lost anything between 30 to 32 ‘nali’ of land, each ‘nali’ having a market value of Rs.1.5-2 lakh or so (more, if near the road). Similar is the story in Aungee village, where a few ‘lucky’ farmers have got Rs.2,500 per Nali of lost/ damaged land as compensation from the Govt (with another 2,500 promised). Most have not got even this meagre amount. (below – large tracts of terraced farm lands – built with great labour over years - washed away).
m. Recovering damaged land / re-building terraces – In the mountain states, much of the cultivable land have been prepared by building terraces on the mountain slopes. This is extremely hard work, with investment of labour & resources. With large scale destruction of these terraced-fields, it will be a herculean task for farmer families to stabilize the land-slide prone slopes and re-build their fields. The government must step in with appropriate measures Using MGNREGA funds to attempt this as one of the measures.
n. Damage to the standing crops – The standing crops of early maturing Potato (called “asaade aloo’ by locals, for maturing in the month of ‘asaad’) have been most severely damaged, and now mostly rotting in the rain-soaked fields. As we found in Bhatwari block of Uttarkashi district, the mid-altitude villages suffered this loss of Potato crop to the maximum. In the higher villages, Apple crops are also badly affected, resulting in apprehension about both the quantity and quality of the crop, for which harvest time is nearing. Paddy crops have been damaged much less, except in those fields swept away or covered with landslide-muck.
o. On top of the huge losses to standing crops, the un-certainty about the incoming crops is critical – Despite the Uttarakhand govt.’s announcement of procuring Potato, Apple etc. -- this is a major challenge for affected areas. With many roads and smaller tracks having been washed away, how to take the crops to markets and/or extend the period before they perish – are not clear to most. Govt announced procurement prices – Rs.12 per Kg of Potato and Rs.27 per Kg of Apple (to be verified) are seemingly not even covering total costs of production (as told by many farmers & other locals).
Though the government is telling that it will procure from the villages, the present experience of even food-rations not reaching remote villages, do not augur well for farmers. The main Potato crop is due in late-September / early October, Apple at similar times, and Rajma (Kidney bean) in October. These are the three main cash crops in these mountains, and for the hard-hit people, the failure to get good prices from these will mean years of extreme hardship to come out of the present disaster.
Bringing a mule-load of 2-‘kattas’ (a ‘katta’ is a 50-Kg sack) of ‘Aloo’ or ‘Sev’ (Apple) from Bhatwari to Gangori, where these can be loaded into trucks (road beyond Netala – 10 KMs above Uttarkashi, is not yet opened, leaving large distance to Bhatwari, and then on to up-hill villages), is costing anything between Rs.1200 to 1600, thus adding an additional transport cost of Rs.12 to 16 per Kilo of produce ! The truck transportation cost and loading labour cost are additional. Who will buy Aloo at bulk for Rs.20 a KG or more, from the hills – to transport to main markets ? Apples are the same story, though marginally less daunting.
p. Critical need to restore all kinds of connectivity - in an appropriate and
sustainable manner. Even main highways are in precarious conditions –
dangerously slushy, sliding and unstable (below – National Highway 108 as
it looked on Sept.01 near Garampani, about 6-7 KMs above Uttarkashi, with
Bhagirathi flowing below). The cost of restoring all the major roads, to allow
buses to ply – will be enormous, and as the locals say – one cannot expect
interior roads to be restored for years.
q. The other connectivity, that of telecommunication, is in a comparatively better
shape, as the cell phone towers are standing in many affected places, but the
lack of power supply has denied many remote village residents from charging
their mobile phones. The provision of solar lanterns with a cell phone charging
port, has helped to some degree, but this is a solution that needs to be taken to
a larger picture and strategy. With future such events in mind, there is a need
to build parallel and stand-alone communication capacity for remote areas.
r. Transportation/ travel costs have gone up sharply, as buses are not able to ply on ‘kutcha’ & soft mud roads, and seeing the opportunity - jeeps are charging heavily for short shuttles. Many places do not have even these, so the very expensive Mule transportation is the only alternative to carrying big loads on human backs up mountain tracks.
(Below – a dangerous daily commute. Above Maneri - 16 KMs beyond Uttarkashi town, women, children, old people, with loads on their backs, walking long distances under the threat of further slides/ rock-falls, by a roaring Bhagirathi river. People are spending many hours on back-breaking treks, just to carry their daily needs, from markets to homes)
s. Apart from roads, other vital infrastructure like water & electricity supply, have been disrupted to many areas & villages. Many traditional water sources (called “shrote” by locals) have been destroyed. (below – a road-side tube-well no one can reach now). Access to clean drinking water will be a major challenge once the monsoon fed small ‘nallahs’ dry out.
t. Forests/Trees - Large tracts of forests & tens of thousands of mature trees have been washed away, often both above and below road construction areas (picture below). Many villagers lost their private trees along with commons.
Repair/ reconstruction of damaged houses and tracks will need lots of wood/ mature trees, and people have little access to ‘protected forests’. (below – thousands of washed away tree-trunks rotting in Tehri dam reservoir near Chiniyalsaur on 31st August 2013).
u. A number of small but important needs - that can improve conditions - have not
been addressed much, such as carrying the produce or even relief material from villages to market & the other way. Most people cannot afford the high hiring charges of mules, and are spending whole days carrying just their provisions on their backs.
v. Many schools have been affected - urgent need to restore school functioning. Teachers of mountain village schools are often not staying in those villages – due to reported lack of food-rations in those villages. Also – many parents are unable to pay school/college fees, leading to stress & deprivation. Many school buildings also damaged. Some serving as temporary shelter for those without homes.
w. Many younger children are not able to go to schools – as roads have been washed away. This is even more serious for girls in hill villages. Also, the tracks restored are often dangerous for younger children – necessitating parents to accompany – if at all. (below – this little girl is unable to go to school now - thru dangerous and long forest tracks, as the father cannot accompany her everyday - both ways).
And these school girls (below – in Assi Ganga valley) have to walk 6-7 KMs each way to school, as the road connection is still disrupted over 13 months after the disaster (from the August 2012 cloud-burst), stopping buses, while the heavily over-loaded/crowded jeeps (Marshal/ Bolero/ Sumo) charge exorbitantly, putting financial strains on an already hit population.
x. Similar problems with old, sick, pregnant mothers – not being able to get health care /check-ups (below – expecting mother in cut-off village, not taken for check-up since the disaster 2 ½ months ago).
y. There is a need to assess and monitor the relief distribution and related
efforts which can be best done by local institutions and organisations.
Monitoring of actions / R&R is also a critical area - not taken up in needed
proportions. Best done by local organizations;
z. Interventions in the direction of restoration/ rehabilitation work & resource allocation; Need for community participation in planning for restoration work / interventions;
(Many of the above mentioned areas - calls for serious & rigorous
ASSESSMENTS - not done well.)
Proposed Areas of Collective Actions --
To a) undertake a systematic assessment of damages and critical needs of 20-25 villages affected in Assiganga valley & Bhagirathi valley ( Uttarkashi-Bhatwari and nearby areas);
b) plan for interventions based on the identified needs - mostly non infrastructural. Both family & community facilities/ provisions – that can improve situations and capacity, in multiple areas (like the critical areas of information access, food crop preservation/ transport, communication, etc. ).
c) identifying & organising community groups, participatory risk & vulnerability analysis, knowledge access & interpretation capacity building, initiating community based/managed risk reduction measures including community infrastructures (independent communication systems, local weather monitoring & warning /information outreach systems, safe shelters..);
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